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On Friday night, March 15, 2013, European leaders trespassed
on consecrated ground. They insisted that Cyprus impose losses -euphemistically dubbed a “solidarity levy” -- on insured depositors with
Cypriot banks as a condition to receiving EU/IMF bailout assistance.
Entering Friday’s meeting, the leaders had four options on the table, none of
them pleasant:
(i)

Give Cyprus a complete bailout (estimated to cost €18
billion).

(ii)

Restructure the outstanding Cypriot bonds, €4.4 billion of
which are governed by Cypriot law and €3.8 billion by
English law.

(iii)

Haircut excess deposits in the Cypriot banking system;
that is, deposits in excess of the €100,000 minimum
covered by the local deposit insurance scheme. These
represent about half of the total deposit base.

(iv)

Haircut the insured deposits.

The European leaders chose options (iii) and (iv). Insured
depositors will suffer a 6.75% loss on their deposits; amounts in excess of
that level will be subject to a solidarity contribution of 9.9%. Holders of
Cypriot sovereign bonds will emerge unscathed. The next bond maturing on
June 3, 2013 in the amount of €1.4 billion -- a large chunk of which is reputed
to have been bought by international hedge funds over the last six months at
prices ranging from 70-75 cents on the euro -- will be paid out at 100 cents
on the euro in about ten weeks. Each depositor in a Cypriot bank, large and
small, will be making a solidarity contribution toward that payment to
bondholders.
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Friday night’s decisions will send two regrettable, and
apparently already regretted, messages. First, that deposit insurance
schemes may protect you if your bank manager absconds with your money
but not if your own government takes it. Second, that, yes indeed, peripheral
Eurozone sovereign bonds do benefit from an implicit northern European
guarantee.
How might it have been different? Here is a sketch of an
alternative approach had Friday’s priority between insured depositors and
bondholders been inverted:
1. All insured depositors to be protected. Indeed, the public
announcement of the bailout package would liberally
sprinkle adjectives such as “sacred” and “inviolable” in front
of the words “insured deposits” wherever they appear.
2. Holders of deposits in excess of the insured €100,000
minimum would receive, at par, interest-bearing bank
certificates of deposit for those excess amounts. Depositors
would be given the option of taking CDs of, say, five or ten
years’ duration, with differing interest rates designed to
encourage a longer stretch out. Also, to encourage a takeup of the longer dated CDs, the Government could offer a
limited recourse guarantee on the ten-year CDs benefiting
from a pledge of a portion of the Cypriot gas revenues that
should come on line when those CDs mature. The CDs
would be freely tradable and liquid in the hands of the
holders.
3. The maturity dates of all sovereign bonds would be
extended by a fixed number of years, let’s say five years.
By our reckoning, this would reduce the total amount of the
required official sector bailout funding during a three-year
program period by about €6.6 billion.
The benefits? Terming out excess deposits will effectively lock
in that funding to the banks for many years. The alternative (debiting 9.9
percent now and watching the balance of 90.1 percent get out of Dodge
when the banks reopen) may easily require the bailout package to be
reworked in a month’s time.
Rescheduling the maturity dates of outstanding sovereign
bonds -- with no haircut to principal or interest rate -- would avoid the need to
have those maturities repaid out of official sector bailout funds. A principal
extension of this kind is the most clement of the three tools in a sovereign
debt restructurer’s tool box, the other two are surgeon’s saws labeled,
respectively, “principal” and “interest”.
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The objections?
•

“The banks still need to be recapitalized.” Answer -- true.
But an institution, one-half of whose funding has been
locked in at a fixed rate for a decade, is a whole lot easier
and cheaper to stabilize than one whose funding (or at least
90.1% of it) is hourly at risk of departure.

•

“The sovereign bonds are not the problem.” Answer -partially true. Unshackled from its submerged banking
sector, the Cypriot sovereign is not in such bad shape. The
immediate objective, however, is to bring the aggregate size
of the bailout package down to a level that will be tolerable
in the eyes of northern European Parliaments. Removing
the bond maturities from the program window should shave
€6.6 billion from that tab, well above the €2.8 billion that
Friday’s plan expects to extract from the reluctant pockets of
retail depositors.

•

“The Cypriot banks own most of the bonds; it will be like
punching a pillow.” Answer -- largely irrelevant. With half of
their liabilities stretched out for many years, stretching out a
portion of their assets is less worrisome.

•

“The holdouts in a bond restructuring will eat you alive.”
Answer -- maybe so, but probably not. Slight more than half
of the bonds are under Cypriot law and these can be dealt
with by a retrofit collection action clause à la grecque. Each
of the English law bonds contains its own collective action
clause. We have elsewhere speculated on a broader
measure that the Eurozone could take to discourage
prospective holdouts.1

There are no painless or riskless options in Cyprus. But the
decisions of Friday night should stand for the proposition that some options
are incandescently more painful and risky than others.
*

*

*
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See Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati & Ignacio Tirado, The Problem of Holdouts in Eurozone
Sovereign Debt Restructurings (January 2013)
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205704).
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